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Closing prices are used for many purposes including val-
uations, marking-to-market accounting, valuation of funds and
their liquidations, measuring the performance of portfolio
managers, and so on. These purposes provide sufficient
grounds for closing price manipulation. Exchanges and poli-
cymakers have to ensure that closing prices are efficient and
free of extraordinary movement or manipulation. For these
reasons, closing prices are often the subject of research.
Although Terry (1986) and Harris (1989) could not identify
any manipulation of closing prices, Comerton-Forde and
Rydge (2006), Comerton-Forde, Lau, and McInish (2007),
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).(2012), Felixson and Pelli (1999); and Hillion and Suominen
(1998b) discovered manipulation in closing prices. Many
studies have proposed call auction sessions at the opening or
closing of continuous auction sessions to ensure more effi-
cient, manipulation-free prices (Barclay, Litzenberger, &
Warner, 1990; Hillion & Suominen, 2004; Muscarella &
Piwowar, 2001; Pagano & Schwartz, 2003, 2005; Smith,
2006; Theissen, 2000).
Market manipulation has been a pervasive issue in Borsa
Istanbul since the late 1990s, and the Capital Markets Board of
Turkey (CMB) and Borsa Istanbul have dealt with many
manipulation cases. At one point, Borsa Istanbul began
opening call auction sessions and the use of unique client IDs
as precautionary measures against market manipulation.
Closing call auction sessions were also proposed by CMB,
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008b) and €Ozcan (2011) to prevent
market manipulation. Finally on March 2, 2012, call auction
sessions were implemented to reduce extraordinary price
movements and to ensure more efficient price formation inting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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call auction sessions effectively serve these purposes. Thus,
this study will serve as feedback to CMB and Borsa Istanbul.
The trader performance method developed by Felixson and
Pelli (1999) is utilized in this study to test for manipulation of
closing prices. The data utilized in this work can be consoli-
dated on the basis of investors; therefore, this article does not
deal with the transactions of dealers or brokerage houses.
Instead, this work is an investor-based analysis that consoli-
dates the transactions of individual investors in all the
brokerage houses with which they do business.
Our study does not use the price at the k1-15 min mark for
returns in the final 15 min of trading. Instead, the weighted
average price (WAP) up to the final 15 min is calculated for
each investor on the basis of the shares of a particular day.
Then, the WAP is calculated using the price at the k-15-
min mark for returns in the final 15 min of trading. By
doing so, our work manages to overcome the challenges faced
by Felixson and Pelli (1999).
This study shows that there had been closing price ma-
nipulations as defined by Felixson and Pelli (1999) prior to the
implementation of closing call auction sessions.
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005) also emphasized the presence of
upward-oriented closing price manipulation in Borsa Istanbul.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the cumulative net position
occurring prior to the final 15-min period to the total quantity
of the transactions is positive and highly significant. This
supports the argument that closing price manipulation had
been occurring. It is observed that the implementation of
closing call auction sessions have significantly eliminated
closing price manipulation. The effect of closing call auction
sessions on Borsa Istanbul conforms to the results of
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), Comerton-Forde et al.
(2007), Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011), and Pinfold and
Danyang (2012).
The finding of this study also conform to the conclusions of
both Akyol and Michayluk (2007), who found closing price
manipulation within the scope of the small orders method, and
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008a), who revealed the existence of
closing price manipulation in Borsa Istanbul on the basis of
intraday broker performance.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The second
section provides a brief literature review. Section 3 describes
the data and lays out methodology. Section 4 elaborates on the
empirical findings. The last section concludes the discussion.
2. Literature review
As closing prices are used for many purposes,2 they are
always subject to manipulation. The general finding of the
studies performed on this issue is that manipulation attempts
and their impact on share prices are concentrated in the 1-h1 k stands for closing time.
2 See also Atilgan, Bali, and Demirtas (2013), €Ozcan (2012), Qian, Xu, and
Yu (2014) and Kadıoglu (2014) for more information.time period prior to close of session. Studies have also
found that the reversal this effect takes place in the first 30 min
of session the following day.
According to Hillion and Suominen (1998a, 1998b, 2004),
Felixson and Pelli (1999), McSherry and Sofanos (1998), Lee
and Mathur (1999), Cushing and Madhavan (2000) and
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005), the following are some underlying
motives for manipulation:
- Attempts are made to increase closing prices of shares in
margin trading, short sales and the borrowing and lending
of securities to either prevent decreases in the value of
securities held for margin account, or to drive up their
value,
- Attempts are made to drive up closing prices of shares in a
given portfolio to demonstrate that the performance of the
portfolio managers or brokers is sound,
- Price interventions are attempted in order to ensure
convergence of both spot and forward prices to a desired
price at the date of maturity in the derivatives market to
either maximize profit or minimize cost,
- Intraday traders aim to intervene in prices for profit,
- Stockbrokers who perform brokerage transactions for
foreign clients manipulate prices to achieve a target
average price given by those clients.
While Terry (1986) and Harris (1989) did not identify any
effect of manipulation on closing prices, Felixson and Pelli
(1999) found that though weak, manipulative transactions
influenced price movements at close of session in the Finland
Stock Exchange. Hillion and Suominen (1998b) also discov-
ered closing price manipulation. The common point of both
Felixson and Pelli (1999) and Hillion and Suominen (1998b) is
that dealer activities are a possible reason for closing price
manipulation. Miller (1989) made this argument as well, stating
that the reason for the rise in prices towards close of session was
the ambition of index fund managers to increase the value of
index funds by increasing the closing prices of shares included
in the portfolio. Many other studies have also found that closing
prices are manipulated (Comerton-Forde & Putnins, 2011;
Comerton-Forde & Rydge, 2006; Comerton-Forde et al.,
2007; Huang & Chan, 2014; Pinfold & Danyang, 2012).
After Hillion and Suominen (1998b) reached the conclu-
sion that high returns and volatility towards close of session
arose from closing price manipulation in the Paris Stock Ex-
change, they proposed closing call auction sessions for this
exchange. Hillion and Suominen once again suggested call
auction sessions to prevent closing price manipulation after
applying their new intermediation-based theoretical model in
2004.
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) in Australia; Comerton-
Forde et al. (2007) in Singapore; Comerton-Forde and Putnins
(2011) in Australia; Pinfold and Danyang (2012) in New
Zealand; and Huang and Chan (2014) in Taiwan investigated
the effect of call auctions on market manipulation. They found
that closing call auction sessions reduced the incidence of
market manipulation. Huang and Tsai (2008) found that
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reducing noise in stock closing prices in Taiwan.
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005) adapted the model developed by
Felixson and Pelli (1999) to the case of Borsa Istanbul during
the period from April 1, 2000 to March 9, 2012. His work
looked at 33 sharesd23 of which were within the BIST Na-
tional 30 Index and 10 of which were outside this index.
Although the R2, F and t values in his study were statistically
insignificant, the sign of the coefficients provided clues about
the existence of manipulative movements towards close of
session. Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2008a) also tested for closing price
manipulation in Borsa Istanbul, analyzing the effect of the size
of the net positions of day traders in 23 stocks selected from
the BIST 30 Index. Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2008a) found that closing
price manipulation through big buyers and big sellers was
possible in Borsa Istanbul.
The small-orders model for detecting closing price
manipulation used by Harris (1989) was tested in Borsa
Istanbul by Akyol and Michayluk (2007). Their study exam-
ined data from BIST 30 shares for the month of January 2005.
They reached the conclusion that the number of small orders
given rose at the close of the second session in Borsa Istanbul.
They viewed this as an indicator of closing price manipulation.
According to Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008b) and €Ozcan
(2011), closing call auction sessions were also proposed by
the CMB as a measure to prevent market manipulation.
3. Data and methodology3.1. DataOut of 319 shares, 102 are used to test the effect of closing
call auction sessions on closing price manipulation in Borsa
Istanbul. This study focuses on 624 days from November 1,
2006 to May 31, 2012. These 102 shares are a random sample
of those traded in the following indexes: 28 shares in BIST 30
Index, 15 shares in BIST 100 Index (apart from those in BIST
30), 38 shares in BIST All Shares Index (apart from those in
BIST 100), and 21 shares in the Second National Market.
The total number of shares traded in BIST and the Second
National Market at the end of 2012 were 242 and 77,
respectively. At the same point in time, the market capitali-
zations of the two indexes were roughly 523.33 billion TL
and 9.36 million TL, respectively. The trading volume of
Borsa Istanbul was 621.98 billion TL in total and 2.46
million TL daily in 2012. The BIST 30 Index contains shares
of the firms with the 30-highest market capitalizations andTable 1
Rule changes in the microstructure of Borsa Istanbul and period used in analysis.
Date Rule changes in microstructure
February 2, 2007 Implemented opening call auction sessions
October 13, 2008 Removed giving order on a disk
April 12, 2010 Decreased price thick
October 8, 2010 Allowed order cancellation
March 2, 2012 Implemented closing call auction sessionstrading volumes. The BIST 100 index also contains shares of
the top 100 firms according to the same criteria (including
the top 30). Our sample consists of shares of 28 of the 30
firms in the BIST 30 Index and shares of 43 firms in the BIST
100 Index.
Stocks were selected based on three criteria: Firstly, it was
ensured that at least 15 shares are included from each of the
four indexes. Secondly, the shares had to be sufficiently traded
to run the analysis. Thirdly, almost half of the sample was
taken from outside the BIST 100 Index, in which most of the
price manipulation cases have been observed. The sample
consists of up to 102 shares, as the data size constrained our
analysis. Therefore, instead of taking the whole period into
account, the data represents the period three months prior to
and three months following the regulation changes in Borsa
Istanbul.
The 624 days of the sample period were selected using the
period three months prior to and three months following the
regulation changes in Borsa Istanbul. Table 1 shows the
regulation changes in the microstructure along with the range
of dates used in the sample period.
To prevent abnormal price movements and to ensure more
efficient price formation, Borsa Istanbul Circular Order 288
issued on March 2, 2012 put into effect closing call auction
sessions in the transaction system of the equity market in
Borsa Istanbul, where closing price movements had been
encountered frequently.
The closing call auction session is a special practice of
transferring the remaining orders from the normal session time
and accepting new orders into the trading system in a pre-
determined period of time without matching. This allows the
maximum amount of transactions to be conducted by the end
of this time period. The call auction session ensures both the
calculation of a single price level known as the closing session
price and the execution of all transactions at this price level.
The price data for 15-min periods of the shares sampled are
taken from Borsa Istanbul trading book entries for the relevant
period. Apart from this, the Borsa Istanbul trading book also
provides data concerning transactions totaling over 3% of the
overall trading activity of a given stock in a single day.
These sorts of large transactions totaling more than 3% of a
given stock's daily trading are only included in the data set if
they occurred within the final 15 min of a session. The
transactions totaling more than 3% of a stock's daily activity
constitute 625.470 lines in the data set. However, this number
is reduced to 107.151 when those investors who did not trade
during the final 15 min are removed.Sample period
November 1, 2006 May 6, 2007
July 12, 2008 January 14, 2009
January 9, 2010 July 14, 2010
July 7, 2010 January 9, 2011
November 30, 2011 May 31, 2012
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15 min prior the close of the second session (k-15) for returns
in the final 15 min. Instead, the WAP is calculated for each
investor on the basis of the shares of those trading between k-
15 and close of session on the day under consideration. By
doing so, this study overcomes the challenges faced by
Felixson and Pelli (1999). With the advantage a trading book,
we are able to find daily buy/sell trading quantity/volume up to
15 min prior to closing time for each share and daily buy/sell
trading quantity/volume within the final 15 min before closing
time for each share. Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics.
The sub rows of Table 2 show average, standard deviation
and maximum value in each main row respectively. The col-
umns show the values in the period that are before or after
implementation of closing call auction session and total values
in the whole period. The first main row shows the descriptive
statistics of daily trading quantity of investors who traded in
102 shares. The second and third main row show the
descriptive statistics of daily buying trading quantity and
volume up to final 15 min prior to closing time. The fourth and
fifth main row show the descriptive statistics of daily selling
trading quantity and volume up to final 15 min prior to closing
time. The sixth and seventh main row show descriptive sta-
tistics of daily buying trading quantity and volume in final
15 min prior to closing time. The eighth and ninth main row
show the descriptive statistics of daily selling trading quantity
and volume in final 15 min prior to closing time. For example,
the average daily buying trading volume up to final 15 minTable 2
Descriptive statistics about daily buy/sell trading quantity/volume.
Before c
Daily Trading Quantity Count
Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Buy Trading Quantity up to 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Buy Trading Volume up to 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Sell Trading Quantity up to 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Sell Trading Volume up to 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Buy Trading Quantity within last 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Buy Trading Volume within last 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Sell Trading Quantity within last 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Max
Daily Sell Trading Volume within last 15-min before closing Average
Std Dev
Maxprior to closing time is 3.918.691 TL when the closing call
auction session is not in operation and the average daily
selling trading volume in the final 15 min prior to closing time
is 105.806 TL when the closing call auction session is in
operation.3.2. MethodologyTo determine whether or not manipulation of closing prices
exists, this study uses a trader performance test developed by
Felixson and Pelli (1999), which was applied to a Turkish
context by Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008a). Our work consti-
tutes a continuation and testing of the propositions of
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008b); therefore, the analysis is con-
ducted by calculating after-session performance as proposed
by Collins and Fabozzi (1991). The data utilized in this work
can be consolidated on the basis of investors using investor
IDs. As a result, this article does not analyze the transactions
of stock exchange dealers or brokerage houses. Rather, an
investor-based analysis is performed by consolidating trans-
actions of individual investors in all the brokerage houses with
which they do business. The vast majority of the manipulation
occurring in Borsa Istanbul involves manipulators using ac-
counts in more than one brokerage house, giving orders on
their own. The trading conducted by dealers is also done on
behalf of clients.
The method for testing the existence of closing price
manipulation is adapted from the work of Felixson and Pellilosing call auction session After closing call auction session Whole sample
95.465 11.686 107.151
6.229.731 6.837.908 6.296.059
16.777.031 15.308.207 16.624.160
648.569.938 218.159.825 648.569.938
323.832 373.998 329.303
1.208.964 1.092.666 1.196.927
104.903.202 22.473.479 104.903.202
1.184.878 1.476.811 1.216.716
3.918.691 4.407.069 3.975.889
414.282.018 105.882.633 414.282.018
313.639 372.110 320.016
1.229.379 1.117.334 1.217.792
109.500.000 20.066.645 109.500.000
1.144.297 1.494.412 1.182.481
3.753.129 4.653.402 3.863.041
273.402.639 106.731.090 273.402.639
41.630 28.166 40.161
189.287 145.545 185.066
11.226.265 6.300.000 11.226.265
154.310 109.112 149.380
610.481 490.416 598.721
40.459.677 16.569.908 40.459.677
40.783 27.941 39.382
200.587 165.120 197.070
11.458.372 10.019.390 11.458.372
151.333 105.806 146.368
58.030.590 18.495.327 58.030.590
647.958 480.174 631.986
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should not to be used to calculate returns for the final 15 min
before close of session. Instead, they recommend that the WAP
of the largest transactions be utilized. Taking this proposition
into consideration, our method makes estimations for each
investor on the basis of the WAP of the largest transactions.
Thus, returns for the final 15 min before close of session are
calculated.
Using logarithmic return formulation as done by Sumiyana
(2007), Felixson and Pelli (1999), Louhichi (2012), Selçuk and
Gençbay (2006), and Engle and Sokalska (2012), the returns in
the final 15 min before close of session are calculated on the
basis of the analysis of the 15-min data of 102 shares traded in
Borsa Istanbul.
ri;t ¼ ln

Pi;k
Pi;k15

ð1Þ
Here, ri;k refers to the final 15-min return for share i before
close of session, Pi;k refers to the closing price of share i and
pi;k15 refers to the price of share i at 15 min before close of
session.
Our work is different from that of Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005)
with regard to the following points:
- The work of Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005) used high-ranking
brokerage houses as a base, referencing those who
perform the largest transactions. In contrast, the model
used in our study tests for closing price manipulation on
the basis of all the transactions of direct investors existing
in different brokerage houses rather than those of the
houses themselves.3 This study takes into consideration
the investors who are among the net traders during the last
15 min before close of session and who produce a trading
quantity at a level equal to or over 3% of all share trading
in the relevant day.
- The model used in our study incorporates the ratio of share
trading of net sellers or buyers during the final 15 min
before close of session to total share trading into the
regression as an independent variable. The impact of the
magnitude of the net position during the last 15-min period
on the closing price (without using a dummy variable) is
measured in a direct manner. In the same vein, our model
treats the ratio of transactions performed in the last 15 min
to total share trading in the relevant day as an independent
variable.
- While the work of Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005) took into ac-
count those who perform the largest transactions in the
final minute, this study considers only those performing
transactions in the final 15 min before close of session.
The performance of an investor refers to the sum of the
values at which the investor buys the shares in their portfolio3 Because the customer-name-based custody system was put into effect in
March 2003, the transactions of individual investors in all brokerage houses
can be consolidated by means of customer numbers.under the calculated closing prices in the buying transactions
and at what value the investor sells the shares from their
portfolio above the calculated closing prices in selling trans-
actions. In other words, using the closing price as a base, the
more the investor buys below and sells above the closing price,
the greater the investor's performance.
In a system operating on the basis of such performance
criteria, the investor either bears the consequences of their
poor performance or tries to manipulate the closing price.
While those simply bearing the consequences of their poor
performance are defined as normal investors, those manipu-
lating closing prices in order to improve their performance are
termed manipulators.
Towards close of session, the manipulator observes that
their WAP in buying transactions is above the closing price,
and tries to use small transactions to drive the closing price up
to the level of their own WAP. Similarly, the manipulator who
observes towards close of session that their WAP in selling
transactions is below the closing price tries to use small
transaction to drive the closing price down to their WAP in
selling transactions. The manipulator attempts to influence the
closing price because of the expense it may incur them. That is
why transactions for changing the closing price are performed
in small quantities.
Fig. 1 demonstrates Felixson and Pelli's model of closing
price manipulation.
The investor who buys at the highest level during intraday
transactions begins to gain insight about what their perfor-
mance will be towards close of session. Whatever their per-
formance proves to be, a normal investor would not dream of
performing manipulative interventions on the closing price.
Even though the normal investor considers their situation
15 min before close of session, they do not take any action. As
a result, the price goes from the point A to the point B within
the market equilibrium. Closing as usual, the price continues
to be develop as usual after close of session, going from point
B to point C.
When the investor who buys at the highest level in intraday
transactions tries to enhance their performance, they attempt to
drive up the closing price. A result of transactions performed
to increase the closing price, the manipulated price is formed
at point E. In this way, the session is closed at this price level,
and the manipulator has thereby reached their target. For the
manipulator who has already done so, there remains no reason
to keep the manipulated price at point E after close of session
because they do not consider prices 15 min after closing to be
performance indicators. Therefore, the price returns to point C,
which is its normal level. The similar revealing of manipula-
tion effect also found in the study of Konga and Wang (2014).
When an investor who sells at the highest level in intraday
transactions tries to enhance their performance, they try to
drive down the closing price. A result of transactions per-
formed to decrease the closing price, the manipulated price is
formed at point D. In this way, the session closes at this price
level, and the manipulator has reached their target. For the
manipulator who has already reached done so, there remains
no reason to keep the manipulated price at point D after close
Fig. 1. Closing price manipulation according to the Felixson and Pelli (1999) model.
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closing to be performance indicators. Therefore, the price
returns to point C, which was its normal level.
The above scenario can be represented with the following
expression:
ri;k15¼NormalReturni;k15þManipulationEffecti;k15þei;k15
ð2Þ
With the elimination of the downward manipulation effect,
the price comes to point C.
ri;kþ15 ¼ Normal Returni;kþ15
þReturn to Market Price Effecti;kþ15 þ ei;kþ15 ð3Þ
There might be multiple manipulators who are differently
positioned with regard to a particular share. Therefore, the
effects of two different manipulations on the closing price
should be measured in conjunction with one another.
In this regard, Equation (2) is as follows:
ri;k15 ¼ Normal Returni;k15þ IMEi;k15þDMEi;k15 þ ei;k15
ð4Þ
Equation (3) is as follows:
ri;kþ15¼NormalReturni;kþ15þRIMEi;kþ15þRDMEi;kþ15þei;kþ15
ð5Þ
When examining manipulative movements occurring to-
wards close of session, the models shown in Equation (4) and
Equation (5) are used.
The impact of investors' transactions on both the returns in
the final 15 min before close of session as well as the final 15-
min returns after close of session, which appear in the Equa-
tions (4) and (5), is measured by means of the following
equation:
ri;k15 ¼f1 þ b1Dnb bi;k15 þ b2Dns si;k15 þ b3IMO1;i þ b4IMO2;i
þ ei;k15
ð6ÞIn Equations (2)e(6), ri;k15 refers to the returns of a given
share in the final 15 min before close of session, while ri;kþ15
refers to the 15-min returns of the share after close of session.
IME refers to manipulation aimed at increasing the closing
price, while DME refers to manipulation aimed at decreasing
the closing price. RIME refers to the reverse impact of
manipulation aimed at increasing the closing price, while
RDME refers to the reverse impact of manipulation aimed at
decreasing the closing price. IMO1 refers to the ratio of cu-
mulative net position until the final 15 min to the total quantity
of transactions of the share on the relevant day. IMO2 refers to
the ratio of cumulative net position in the final 15 min to the
total quantity of transactions of the share on the relevant day.
Dnb bi;k15 and Dns si;k15 are dummy variables that take the
following values:
Dnb bi;k15 : Investors who are net buyers until the final 15
minutes and remain buyers in the final 15 minutes are 1.
Otherwise they are 0.
Dns si;k15 : Investors who are net sellers until the final 15
minutes and remain sellers in the final 15 minutes are 1.
Otherwise they are 0.
IMO1 and IMO2 variables are calculated by using the Borsa
Istanbul trading book, which contains all data relating to
transactions (share, quantity, price, buyer ID, seller ID, and so
on). It is also possible to consolidate transactions in terms of
clients based on investor IDs. IMO1 and IMO2 variables are
calculated using a database program.
Equation (6) is rather different from the equations used in
the work Felixson and Pelli (1999). Equation (6) contains
IMO1 and IMO2 variables; therefore, there is no need for
dummy variables to represent those who perform buying and
selling transactions at the same time. Instead of dummy var-
iables for those investors, the ratio of IMO2 in the final 15 min
to the total number of transactions is used. If there exists any
manipulation, the interaction of its effect with the net quantity
of transactions will be measured in this way.
Table 3
The comparative regression results for the last 15-minute returns (k-15).
Before the implementation of closing call auction session After the implementation of closing call auction session
Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
f1 0.0003* 4.43 0.001* 9.64
Dnb bi;k15 0.0006* 4.20 0.000 0.17
Dns si;k15 0.0016* 9.94 0.001* 4.00
IMO1 0.0119* 17.08 0.008* 5.99
IMO2 0.0213* 9.45 0.014* 2.51
F 150.34* 13.48
R2 0.007 0.006
# of observation 85406 11686
Note: * indicates 1% significance level. While it is thought that the reason for the R2 to having low values is grounded in the structure of the data utilized in this
work (the data contains an excessive variety of investors and shares), the existence of the relationship between the investors who perform the highest levels of
buying and selling transactions and the returns for the last 15-min period is important in revealing closing price manipulation.
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þ ei;kþ15
ð7Þ
The hypotheses stated below are tested using Equations (6)
and (7).
If manipulative aimed at increasing the closing price occurs,
there should be price movement starting at point A moving
firstly towards point E and then towards point C (Fig. 1). This
movement should be caused by those investors who are net
buyers until the final 15min before close of session and continue
performing transactions in the direction of net buying.
The coefficient of the dummy variable constructed for those
who are net buyers until the final 15 min before close of
session and remain buyers in the final 15 min should be pos-
itive and significant in Equation (6), and it should be negative
and significant in Equation (7). The hypothesis for closing
price manipulation aimed at increasing the closing price is
shown below.
H0 : b1  0 and d1  0; H1 : b1>0 and d1<0 ð8Þ
If manipulation aimed at decreasing the closing price oc-
curs, there should be price movement starting at point A
moving firstly towards point D and then towards point C
(Fig. 1). This movement should be caused by those investors
who are net sellers until the last 15 min and continue per-
forming transactions in the direction of net selling.
The coefficient of the dummy variable constructed for those
who are net sellers until the final 15 min before close of
session and remain sellers in the final 15 min should be
negative and significant in Equation (6). This coefficient
should be positive and significant in Equation (7). The hy-
pothesis for closing price manipulation intended to decrease
closing price is shown below.
H0 : b2  0 and d2  0; H1 : b2<0 and d2>0 ð9Þ
4. Empirical results
Equation (6) is used to measure the relationship between
the final 15-min returns and investors who are either netbuyers until the final 15 min and remain buyers or those who
are net sellers until the last 15 min and remain sellers. Table 3
provides the statistical results. It is assumed that b1 will be
positive and significant and that b2 will be negative and sig-
nificant. This is because investors who are net buyers until the
final 15 min and remain buyers try to ensure a higher closing
price, so there will be a positive relationship between the final
15-min returns and Dnb b. On the other hand, those who are net
sellers until the final 15 min and remain sellers try to ensure a
lower closing price, so there will be a negative relationship
between the last 15-min returns and Dns s.
Table 3 provides the statistical results of Equation (6),
which is used to test the existence of closing price manipu-
lation before and after the implementation of call auction
sessions. As expected, the coefficient of Dnb b is positive with
a fairly high level of significance.
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of Dns s is also
positive and significant before the implementation of closing
call auction sessions. As noted by Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005,
2008a), the reason for Dss having a positive and significant
coefficient is that the majority of closing price manipulations
in Borsa Istanbul are aimed at increasing the closing price.
Many studies suggest that this is so because of the existence of
intraday structures.
Table 3 indicates that there is a positive, highly significant
variable coefficient for the ratio of the cumulative net position
until the final 15-min period to the total quantity of the
transactions (IMO1). This suggests the existence of closing
price manipulation. In other words, the higher the net-buyer
position of an investor until the last 15 min, the greater their
opportunity to influence the final 15-min returns. This situa-
tion itself supports the argument that closing prices are
manipulated to enhance stock performance at the close of the
day. This increases the value of securities, equities and/or the
valuation of all assets tied to the closing price.
The coefficient of Dnb b is positive and insignificant after
the implementation of closing call auction sessions. This
suggests that closing call auction sessions reduce the impact of
manipulation. On the other hand, the coefficient of Dnb b,
which was positive and significant before the implementation
of closing call auction sessions, becomes insignificant with
their implementation.
Table 4
The comparative regression results of 15-minute returns (k þ 15).
Before the implementation of closing call auction session After the implementation of closing call auction session
Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
f1 0.003* 13.18 0.003* 5.97
Dnb bi;kþ15 0.001* 2.71 0.003* 3.49
Dns si;kþ15 0.002* 4.78 0.003* 3.22
IMO1 0.031* 14.26 0.022* 5.41
IMO2 0.027* 3.87 0.0001 0.004
F* 107.44 15.24
R2 0.005 0.005
# Of observation 85406 11686
Note: * indicates 1% significance level.
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returns 15 min after close of session and investors who are
either net buyers until the last 15 min and remain buyers or
those who are net sellers until the last 15 min and remain
sellers. Table 4 provides the statistical results. It is expected
that d1 will be negative and significant and that d2 will be
positive and significant. This is because the investors who are
net buyers until the last 15 min and remain buyers will no
longer be able to drive up the closing price (turnaround the
normal market price). Thus, there will be a negative rela-
tionship between returns 15 min after close of session and
Dnb b. On the other hand, investors who are net sellers until the
last 15 min and remain sellers will no longer be able to drive
down the closing price (turnaround the normal market price).
Thus, there will be a positive relationship between returns
15 min after close of session and Dns s.
Table 4 provides the statistical results of Equation (7),
which is used to test the existence of closing price manipu-
lation before and after the implementation of closing call
sessions. As expected, the coefficient of Dnb b is negative with
a fairly high level of significance.
Contrary to expectations, however, the coefficient of Dns s
is also negative and significant. As noted by Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu
(2005, 2008a), the reason for Dns s having a negative and
significant coefficient is that the majority of closing price
manipulations in Borsa Istanbul are aimed at increasing the
closing price. Many studies suggest that this is so because of
the existence of intraday structures.
Table 3 supports the first pillar of the argument of Felixson
and Pelli (1999) stating that manipulators perform upwardly
manipulative interventions on closing prices in order to
enhance the performance of investors making the largest
buying transactions prior to the final 15 min. The second pillar
of their argument is that prices will return to normal levels
because manipulators, who have already reached their targets
after closing, will no longer intervene in prices after close of
session. The results in Table 4 support this argument, as well.
The impact of market price turnaround as noted by Felixson
and Pelli (1999) is negative and significant.4 In our model, they refer to the investors performing buying transactions
that are equal to or over 3% of the total quantity of day trading.According to the model of Felixson and Pelli (1999), in-
vestors who perform the largest buying transactions4 engage in
manipulative transactions to increase closing prices, thus
enhancing their closing performance. This causes increased
closing prices. This situation itself presents parallels with the
argument that closing prices are manipulated to enhance per-
formance at the end of the day. This improves the valuation of
margin securities and all assets tied to closing prices. On the
other hand, the implementation of closing call auction sessions
has made this relationship statistically insignificant.
To summarize the findings:
1 There is a clear evidence of closing price manipulation in
Borsa Istanbul prior to the implementation of the closing
call auction sessions.
2 The results obtained in this work support the conclusions
of Akyol and Michayluk (2007), who found closing price
manipulation within the scope of the small orders model.
Findings are also consistent with those of Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu
(2005, 2008a), who revealed the existence of closing price
manipulation in Borsa Istanbul on the basis of the intraday
performance model.
3 As emphasized by Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008a), closing
price manipulation seen in Borsa Istanbul is aimed at
increasing closing prices.
4 The variable coefficient of the ratio of cumulative net
position until the final 15-min period to the total quantity
of transactions is positive and highly significant. This
proves the existence of closing price manipulation.
5 The implementation of closing call auction sessions has
significantly eliminated closing price manipulation. The
obstructing effect of call auction sessions on closing price
manipulation was also found in the work of Comerton-
Forde and Rydge (2006), Comerton-Forde et al. (2007),
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011), Pinfold and Danyang
(2012) and Huang and Chan (2014).5. Conclusion
Closing call auction sessions were one of the measures
proposed to prevent market manipulation. They entered into
force on March 2, 2012 to reduce extraordinary price
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Borsa Istanbul.
Our study aims to test the existence of closing price
manipulation and the effect of closing call auction sessions on
closing price manipulation by analyzing 102 shares in Borsa
Istanbul. The analysis is conducted on 624 trading days from
November 1, 2006 to May 31, 2012.
The trader performance method developed by Felixson and
Pelli (1999) is utilized in this work to test whether or not
closing prices were manipulated. Unlike in Felixson and Pelli's
model, however, the weighted average price (WAP) is calcu-
lated for individual investors on the basis of the shares of those
trading at the k-15 mark until the last 15 min of the day under
consideration. By doing so, our work manages to overcome
the challenges faced by Felixson and Pelli (1999).
Within of the model of Felixson and Pelli (1999), it is
statistically possible to discuss the existence of closing price
manipulation in Borsa Istanbul prior to the implementation of
closing call auction sessions. As emphasized by
Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008a), closing price manipulation
seen in Borsa Istanbul is aimed at increasing closing prices.
The findings of our study also support the conclusions of
Akyol and Michayluk (2007), who found closing price
manipulation within the scope of the small orders model. They
also support the conclusions of Ku¨çu¨kkocaoglu (2005, 2008a),
who revealed the existence of closing price manipulation in
Borsa Istanbul on the basis of the intraday performance model.
As revealed by other studies, the implementation of closing
call auction sessions has significantly eliminated closing price
manipulation.
It would be beneficial for future studies to test closing price
manipulation with reference to the intermediation model
proposed by Hillion and Suominen (2004).
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